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The development of evaluation as a profession is marked by different diffusion waves and 
assumptions of what good governance and associated evaluation evidence entail. With every new 
wave, an increasing number of countries adopted common evaluation practices. The question is 
whether this also implies commonalities in the way that evaluations are practised nowadays, or 
whether differences rather prevail.  
In this contribution, we analyse the volume and type of sediments which different waves have 
deposited. We focus on three evaluation practices that represent the major waves and that are 
exemplary for regulatory governance in Europe: administrative burden measurement or standard 
cost model; regulatory impact assessment; and randomized controlled trials and nudges.  
We contribute to both the policy evaluation literature and the literature on policy styles by 
proposing a typology that links waves of evaluation diffusion with prescriptive evaluation theories. 
While we do not find evidence for a homogenisation of evaluation styles, we highlight that the 
practices based on economic methods for consolidating evidence have a substantial impact on 
public administration culture. 
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Since the 1960s, with the emergence of the evaluation field, policy evaluation has been in constant 
flux. New evaluation approaches were introduced, others were heavily criticised and disappeared 
or regained momentum in revised ways (Furubo and Sandahl, 2002; Vedung, 2010). Full of many 
techniques for assessing policy effectiveness and efficiency, the current toolbox is the result of 
sedimentation from different waves of evaluation diffusion (Furubo and Sandahl, 2002; Stame, 
2003; Vedung, 2010). Each wave came with specific assumptions of what good governance and 
associated evaluation evidence entail. Since every new wave also contributed to the dissemination 
of evaluation practices across European Union (EU) countries (Jacob et al., 2015; Pattyn et al., 
2018; Stockmann and Meyer, 2020), the aim of this contribution is to observe the extent of 
commonalities in the way that evaluation is practiced nowadays. On the one hand, one could argue 
that with each wave novel but largely diffused methods are laid over existing and country-specific 
evaluation approaches, gradually resulting in an ‘international evaluation culture’ (Barbier and 
Hawkins, 2012: 12). Countries can be assumed to develop isomorphic behavior in this regard 
(Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). This converging trend would be in line with the efforts of 
international organisations (such as the EU, the World Bank, and the OECD) to promote common 
evaluation standards and techniques (Furubo and Sandahl, 2002; Stame, 2003). On the other hand, 
despite this extensive process of homogenization, evaluation practices may still differ across 
countries. Whether and how certain evaluation methods are adopted is to large extent mediated 
by a given country’s administrative and legal tradition (Peters, 1997; 2008).  
Evaluation is a political activity by nature, and its contours happen in the context of polities and 
political communities (Weiss 1993; see also Barbier and Hawkins, 2012). Therefore, an evaluation 
style, defined here as the evaluation practice consolidated in a particular country’s administrative 
tradition, influences the policy formulation, and the resulting outputs. However, evaluation styles 
may be alterated by the consolidation of methods and practices brought by successive waves. The 
speed of convergence towards a common international evaluation culture depends on whether the 
sediments from different diffusion waves are large or rather small.  
Testing convergence in evaluation styles constitutes a challenging empirical puzzle. And we are 
not the first in addressing it (see e.g. Barbier and Hawkins, 2012 for a country by country volume 
on ‘evaluation cultures’). However, our approach is unique. By analyzing the extent of institutional 
change brought by three regulatory appraisal systems, we differentiate how successful each wave 
is nurturing a common evaluation culture. Specifically, we look at countries’ experience in (1) 
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administrative burden measurement or Standard Cost Model (SCM), as the main sediment of the 
new public management and neo-liberal wave, (2) regulatory impact assessment (RIA), that has 
been brought in many countries by both the neo-liberal wave and the evidence-based policy wave 
(Radaelli 2010), and (3) randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to test “nudges” and behavioral 
insights, that are predominantly associated with the most recent evidence-based policy-making 
wave. The evaluation methods selected share the purpose of enhancing regulatory quality and 
therefore allows for a meaningful comparison. Empirically, alhough we acknowledge that 
evaluation practices spread also across policy fields (Barbier and Hawkins; 2012; Pattyn et al., 2018; 
Stockmann and Meyer, 2010), our level of analysis is at the country level. And we limit our 
observations to EU countries, allowing us to magnify the convergence towards a common 
evaluation styles. 
In the next section, we concisely review different possible conceptions of evaluation style and link 
different waves of evaluation diffusion with prescriptive evaluation theories. This conceptual map 
sets the background for the actual empirical analysis in which we approach evaluation styles from 
a triple lense. We first identify how countries define the different regulatory governance practices. 
Second, we describe to what extent SCM, RIA and nudge units have spread, shedding light on 
their diffusion drivers and barriers. Finally, we look at the actual implementation and 
institutionalisation of the practices. In the conclusion, we discuss whether our qualitative findings 
confirm the emergence of a common European evaluation culture. 
2 Evaluation styles? A conceptual exploration 
A plethora of conceptualizations of policy evaluation circulate in the literature (King, 2003), which 
is partially due to the strong practitioner-oriented nature of the field, with different evaluators 
often having different understandings of what an evaluation is. Inspired by Vedung (2010), we opt 
for a deliberately parsimonious and comprehensive definition of evaluation: a ‘careful assessment 
of public sector interventions, their organization, content, implementation, outputs, or outcomes, 
which is intended to play a role in future decision situations’.  
Several scholars attempted to develop taxonomies of evaluation approaches (see e.g. Shadish et 
al., 1991; Widmer and Rocchi, 2012). The most seminal one is probably Alkin and Christie’s (2012) 
evaluation tree. They grouped all main evaluation prescriptive theories in three branches 
depending on whether they put main emphasis on the methods for conducting evaluations, the 
valuing aspect of evaluations, or the use of the evaluations. We maintain that each evaluation 
branch corresponds to a particular evaluation style.  
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From a more historical perspective, evaluation styles can be approached along the lines of five 
different generations. Table 15.1 provides an overview of the distinguishing characteristics of each 
generation. The last three generations still reflect the main approaches around which the present 
day evaluation field revolves. Typically associated with scholars as Scriven (1991), and Rossi and 
Freeman (1985), the third generation is still considered the mainstream evaluation approach. The 
evaluator takes up the role of ‘judge’, which differs from the mere technical and descriptive roles 
of the previous two generations (Guba and Lincoln, 1990, p.30). By relying on effectiveness and 
efficiency criteria, the evaluator is supposed to make explicit judgements on the merit or worth of 
the evaluand. The ‘fourth generation’, introduced under this very label by Guba and Lincoln 
(1990), represents a responsive social constructivist approach to evaluation. This evaluation 
generation is an antonym of ‘preordinate’ evaluation where  the parameters and boundaries of the 
evaluation have been defined prior to the start of an evaluation. The fourth generation is 
characterized by an “an interactive, negotiated process that involve all stakeholders” (Guba and 
Lincoln 1990, 38-39). 
Scholars recently identified the emergence of a fifth generation (Brousselle and Buregeya, 2018), 
coined as the ‘explanation’ generation. This generation emphasizes the importance of theory-based 
approaches to evaluation such as realist evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997), contribution analysis 
(Mayne, 2012), and logic analysis (Rey et al., 2012). These methods highlight the explanatory power 
of contextual characteristics, implementation processes, and causal pathways to show how an 
intervention’s activities and outputs led to outcomes.  
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Table 15.1: The five generations of evaluation (Authors, elaborating on Lai, 1991, p.4) 
Instead of generations, others used the diffusion waves analogy to describe different fads and 
fashions in evaluation practicing over time. Stame (2003) and Furubo and Sandahl (2002) 
distinguish three major waves of evaluation diffusion, each relying on different catalyzing factors. 
The first wave mainly originated in the US with the Great Society (1960s-1970s), but also swept 
over some European countries as Sweden, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. Evaluation 
requirements were structurally incorporated in the introduction of new social programs and 
political tools, and reflected a political culture favoring an engineering or rationalist approach to 
policy making. Those pioneering countries in policy evaluation all invested tremendously in the 
development of strong national statistical institutions (Furubo and Sandahl, 2002). The second 
wave of diffusion (1980s-1990s) is marked by the launching of the New Public Management 
(NPM) doctrine, first in Australia and New Zealand, but also in some European countries. The 
creation of independent agencies and quangos had a major impact on the rowing and steering 
capabilities of ministers. Measures of efficiency and effectiveness became a core prerequisite for 
the well-functioning of NPM modeled administrations. Since the 2000s, the third wave is 
associated with the influence of international organisations such as the European Union and the 
World Bank on evaluation practice. The structural funds program, for instance, has played a major 
role in the spreading of evaluation practice across European countries (Stame, 2003; Pattyn et al., 
2018). 
Also Vedung (2010) identified different evaluation waves. However, he is more explicit about the 
type of approaches and methods they are commonly associated with. As such, he marked the 
1960s as the ‘scientific wave’, with evaluations to be conducted by academics, preferably via RCTs, 
to identify the most effective means to an end. This wave eroded in the 1970s, with the emergence 
of more democratic, reponsive and participatory-based types of evaluation, coined under the label 
of the ‘dialogical wave’. This wave brought about the importance of users and practitioners’ 
perspectives on public service and policy quality. The 1980s saw the dominance of NPM 
managerial thinking. This ‘neo-liberal wave’ puts an emphasis on efficiency-oriented (such as cost-
benefit analysis; cost-effectiveness analysis) and client-oriented approaches to evaluation. More 
recently, the ‘scientific wave’ has returned, though now framed under the umbrella of ‘evidence-
based policy making’ (EBPM) and ‘what works’. Method-wise, this wave involves a renaissance 
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for scientific experimentation and RCTs, often associated with behavioural insights and nudging. 
Meanwhile, consensus is growing, at least in evaluation discourse, that no single evaluation 
approach has the monopoly on good evidence, and that different approaches to causality are fit 
for different policy settings (Pattyn, 2019). 
Having sketched the different generations and diffusion waves, it is useful to link them to the 
particular branches of Alkin and Christie’s theory tree. As such, in Table 15.2 we combine the 
strengths of both a historical as well as a more theoretical outlook on evaluation practices. With 
this chapter focusing on evaluation practices of regulatory governance, we do not put too much 
emphasis on the dialogical wave that preceded the emergence of the regulatory state in Europe 
and elsewhere but the United States (Majone 1994). Further, the NPM and the EBPM waves 
epitomise the evolution of evaluation practice within the European Commission. In Table 15.2, 
the column ‘methods’ describes several dimensions and features of the method branch of the 
evaluation tree. This branch is linked with the scientific mode of evaluation. This mode is pursued 
through scientific methods as RCTs and quantitative analysis for establishing cause-effect 
relationship. Accordingly, it is predominantly associated with the first (measurement) and the more 
recent (explanation) generation. The ‘valuing’ evaluation branch is mainly associated with the NPM 
wave, given its emphasis on value for money and customer satisfaction. Through the development 
of professional evaluation standards typical of the third generation, evaluators, consultants, and 
auditors are given a central role in this regard.  
 
Features Evaluation branches 
Methods Valuing 
Social context and wave 
of diffusion 
Scientific & EBPM waves NPM & neoliberal wave 
Scope Best scientific evidence; focus on 
understanding cause- effect of 
interventions  
Making judgment; focus on 
accountability  
 
Main actors Scientists Evaluators, Consultants, and Auditors 
Practice Experiments and quasi-experiments; 
systematic literature review and meta-
analysis  
 
Indicators, performance measures, 
ranking and benchmarking; 




Research method  
 
Quantitative models for cause-effect 
relationships  
 
Indicators and quantitative measures 
for ranking and assessing performances 




‘What Works’ centres and Nudge unit 
in the UK 
 
Standard Cost Models in the 
Netherlands 
 
Table 15.2: Features of regulatory evaluation branches in Europe  
As mentioned in the introduction, the waves gradually implied a worldwide dissemination of 
evaluation practice, and triggered governments to further institutionalize evaluation in the policy 
process. Generally speaking, most EU countries have clearly matured in institutionalizing 
evaluation practice. Nonetheless, as systematic country comparions revealed (Jacob, Speer and 
Furubo 2015; Stockmann and Meyer, 2020), there remain substantial differences in the extent and 
modalities of institutionalization in the evaluation conducted both in the executive and legislative 
branches of government. Based on their cross-country comparions, Jacob et al. (2015) conclude 
that there are different paths towards evaluation culture. This led them to assume that ‘[n]ational 
policy styles can shape patterns of policymaking in systems of public administration, and it can be 
assumed that some of these national characteristics have an impact on evaluation regardless of the 
particularities of different policy fields and organizations’ (Jacob, Speer, and Furubo 2015: 7). 
Intimate relationships exist in the way how policy evaluation is thought of, and organized within 
the institutional setting of a given country (Barbier and Hawkins, 2012: 6). It is not clear, though, 
to what extent this also implies that there are clear differences in using specific evaluation 
instruments brought by different evaluation waves. This is exactly the empirical question that we 
will discuss in the remainder of the chapter.  
3. Convergence and divergence in regulatory evaluation practices 
3.1. Administrative burden measurement and Standard Cost Model 
Since the introduction of the NPM doctrine, central emphasis has been put on the reduction of 
regulatory administrative burdens or red tapes. ‘Administrative burdens refer to regulatory costs 
in the form of asking for permits, filing out forms, and reporting and notification requirements 
for the government’ (OECD 2006, 9). A broader definition is provided by Burden et al. (2012, p. 
741) who conceives administrative burden as ‘an individual’s experience of policy implementation 
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as onerous’. Sustained when firms and citizens interact and exchange information with the public 
administration, administrative burdens can entail learning (the search processes to collect 
information), psychological (associated with individuals’ emotional state for dealing wth 
administrative processes), and compliance costs (the costs of completing forms and providing 
documentation of status) (Moynihan, Herd and Harvey, 2015). It is clear that the OECD’s 
definition and countries’ effort to reduce administrative burden is limited to the narrow element 
of the latter category of compliance costs, as such overlooking the other (and possibly more 
relevant) elements of administrative burdens.  
The most popular evaluation tool for reducing administrative cost, the Standard Cost Model 
(SCM) has particularly been engrafted on this conception. SCM is ‘a policy instrument for 
measuring the compliance costs of legal information obligations from businesses, institutions and 
civilians to government and governmental institutions’ (Nijsen 2013). As a cost minimization 
technique, it relies on a relatively simple measurement formula: The cost of each information 
obligation incurred by a ‘typical firm’ is multipled by the number of firms and the times the 
information is required (Torriti, 2007) . The cost estimation may rely on surveys of a representative 
sample of firms. Although the SCM has been used for ex-post evaluation of business regulatory 
environment, the tool is also exploited for assessing the likely impact of administrative burdens. 
Indeed, granted that regulatory benefits remain unquestioned by the SCM, the quantification of 
administrative costs allows to set reduction cost targets (Coletti and Radaelli 2013) and score 
regulatory options (Nijsen 2013).  
Almost the totality of the EU member states currently applies SCM and related techniques 
(Wegrich 2009; Heidbreder, Wegrich, and Fazekas 2010). With the potential to enhance business 
competitiveness and the efficiency of a country’s regulatory and administrative environment 
(Coletti and Radaelli 2013), the politically neutral cost-effectiveness (to attain the desired goals and 
social benefits) methodology has been the main driver of diffusion (Nijsen 2013). This rapid 
diffusion has been facilitated by the simplicity of the underpinning evaluation methodology that 
lends itself to relatively easy implementation (Nijsen 2013, p. 234). In other words, ‘[i]t appears as 
if the glow of pragmatism rests on SCM and it is this, which made it so popular particularly among 
government officials’ (Weigel 2008, p. 26). With its narrow concept and simplicity, it has been a 




In Europe, the adoption of SCM has been advocated by the International SCM Network (Nijsen 
2013), a network of high-level civil servant led by the Dutch government that has now ceased its 
activities. By agreeing on a common manual for measuring administrative burdens, the 
International SCM Network was also able to set the agenda in several international organisations. 
In mid-2000s, both the World Bank and the OECD initiated an international reviews of the SCM 
implementation (OECD 2006; World Bank 2007). While the reviews exhibited some skepticism 
of the evaluation methodology, it can also be read as a legitimisation of the method by international 
organisations. In fact, the reduction of administrative burdens was mainly promoted as an initial 
step towards more ambitious reforms of regulatory governance and as a feasible solution for 
countries with limited administrative capacity (Coletti and Radaelli 2013; Nijsen 2013). Also the 
European Commission played a major role in the diffusion through the lauch of the 2007 action 
programme to reduce administrative burdens by 25% by 2012. Whereas before 2007, only 10 EU 
member states adopted the SCM, at the end of 2009, Slovakia was the only country that did not 
adopt any administrative burdens reduction strategy (Heidbreder, Wegrich, and Fazekas 2010).   
Its straightforward applicability and the promotion by international organisations and pioneering 
countries as the Netherlands contributed to a relatively uniform administrative burdens’ evaluation 
style in Europe (De Francesco 2011). This is not to say that there is no cross-country variation in 
other dimensions of institutionalisation, such as the establishment of an oversight body that 
ensures the accomplishment of the reduction target, the baseline measurement for the stock of 
regulation, and the establishment of an administrative burdens reduction target. However, this 
variation is largely associated with the time necessary for institutionalising such regulatory 
governance instrument (Heidbreder, Wegrich, and Fazekas 2010). It is not surprising that pioneers 
and early adopters have implemented the SCM extensively vis-à-vis later adopters. Therefore, we 
have no indication that the implementation of SCM is strongly associated with broader institutional 
conditions and countries’ particular policy style.  
Although SCM is still widely used today, which can be seen as a clear sediment of NPM, the 
methodology has been increasingly contested by scholars, mainly for its limited economic 
rationality (Torriti 2007). Criticism especially increased, since the EBPM wave reached Europe in 
the 2000s, and with the 2008-9 global financial crisis. The constellation of the financial crisis and 
other wicked problems such as climate and technological change forced European governments 
and the EU institutions to go beyond internal management problems, and to consider ‘what works’ 
from a broader cause-effect point of view. Thus the international and national political agenda 
supporting the SCM and the administrative burdens has consistently faded away. Indeed, since 
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2005 the World Bank has been publishing global rankings of administrative burdens, undermining 
the international promotion of the SCM and limiting the scholarly interest to the application of 
the administrative-burden effectiveness methodology to specific sectors such health and taxation 
(Nielsen et al, 2017). 
3.2.  Regulatory Impact Assessment 
Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) revolves around a umbrella concept that is larger than the 
SCM. RIA encompasses ‘a range of methods aimed at systematically assessing the negative and 
positive impacts of proposed and existing regulation’ (OECD 1997). Although usually associated 
with cost and benefit analysis, Pareto efficiency and comprehensive rationality, RIA is frequently 
used to assess the impact of new regulations on business and social welfare, administrative and 
paperwork burdens, regulatory burdens on small businesses, and the consequences for 
international trade and employment. Its particular methodology and design vary depending on the 
policy objectives, and a given country’s administrative process (De Francesco 2013). The following 
two elements are nonetheless common to any RIA system: i) an explanation of the specific need 
for regulation; ii) a systematic and consistent economic appraisal of foreseeable impacts arising 
from that regulation.  
Since the end of the 1990s, RIA has been actively promoted by international organisations, initially 
as part of an NPM neo-liberal wave, but later also as an essential supporting tool for EBPM. The 
OECD has been successful in creating a community of reformers engaged in disparate policy 
reform agendas, such as deregulation, business competitiveness, and regulatory quality (Radaelli 
2005). At present, it can be said that RIA has some kind of ‘inherent symbolism’ (Mossberger 
2000). Not only is it a referential symbol, a way to name and make sense of the required regulatory 
reform, but it is also a condensation symbol which exemplifies governments’ association of 
regulation with poor economic and social performance (De Francesco 2013).  
Although the RIA label has been attached to a variety of functional purposes, which has led to a 
loosely bundled, even ambiguous concept, its symbolism has allowed the OECD to provide its 
member states with inferential shortcuts about the model they can emulate (De Francesco 2013). 
By reframing RIA as a tool to enhance the empirical evidence of decision-making, the OECD 
triggered governments in taking the decision to adopt RIA, even despite a lack of evidence of the 
impact of RIA on citizens’ welfare (Cowen 2005). This led to a diffusion wave around 1995, when 
the OECD launched regulatory reform recommendations based on RIA. Another diffusion wave 
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was pushed in motion with the European Commission’s adoption of RIA in the beginning of 
2000s.  
The diffusion of RIA is almost complete among EU and OECD countries: A 2017 OECD survey 
attests that that the almost totality of 44 RIA systems assessed (including the European 
Union,several EU member states, and non-OECD members) has adopted RIA (OECD, 2018). 
Only Latvia responded of not having written RIA guidelines. Furthermore, 35 systems have a body 
responsible for reviewing the quality of RIAs, the so-called regulatory oversight body (OECD, 
2018).  
Qualitative analyses corroborated the important role of the OECD in promoting RIA, regulatory 
oversight bodies, as well as evaluative practices of CBA in environmental policy. The OECD 
regulatory review was the main driver of RIA’s adoption in Austria, France, Germany, and Italy. 
RIA as a tool for the economic competitiveness agenda also constituted the main rationale for its 
adoption in Greece, Portugal and in several Central and Eastern European countries (De 
Francesco 2016). Quantitative studies revealed the patterns of interaction among governments, 
that were facilitated by the OECD, and that provided them with a simple cognitive map for taking 
the decision to adopt IA (De Francesco 2012).  
When it comes to the actual implementation and institutionalisation of RIA, similar patterns have 
been found than for SCM implementation: scholars revealed a negative correlation between years 
of adoption and the extent of implementation (De Francesco 2013; Radaelli and Meuwese 2009). 
Facilitated by the ideational role of the OECD, trends of convergence are mainly associated with 
the legal design and the evaluative practices of regulatory analysis, but not with regulatory oversight 
and regulatory quality indicators. Also legal origin has a role in explaining the variation in 
implementation. English legal origin countries have the highest implementation scores, followed 
by French and German legal origin countries. Scandinavian legal origin countries instead even lag 
behind the post-socialist countries (De Francesco 2013). Importantly, and different from the SCM, 
the sophistication of the RIA tool involves the risk of mere symbolic adoption. RIA practice has 
resulted in sometimes severe criticism of not conforming to evaluation quality standards. For 
example, it has been criticized that RIAs are usually carried out by the same public officials who 
are responsible for drafting legislation, and who are foremost interested in producing a legally 
sound regulation which fits into the existing legal fabric. It has been also said that the persons 
working on RIAs often lack the competencies to perform an actual impact analysis (Stockmann 
and Meyer, 2020).  
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Compared to SCM, the RIA evaluative models and practices were not transferred through 
government-to-government communication among countries. Whereas the SCM was a more easily 
transferable evaluative model, governments that were engaged with the institutionalization of RIA 
relied on their own direct experience, and which was shaped by the administrative context. 
Accordingly, we can conclude that a country’s RIA style is characterized by the extent and quality 
of its institutionalisation, which is in turn influenced by the maturity of its regulatory state. For its 
overarching goal of improving regulatory governance, RIA is an instrument that has spread in 
punctuated diffusion waves. Differently from SCM, however, and despite the criticism, RIA still 
has a central place on political and scientific agendas of many countries. 
3.3. RCTs and Nudges 
After having lost some fad with the emergence of the dialogical and participatory wave of 
evaluation, RCTs has reconquered a firm place in the evaluation toolbox with the EBPM 
movement. At present, RCTs are by many still conceived to be the golden standard in evaluation. 
Resonating with a rational and positivist take on policy interventions, RCTs and experiments at 
large have the ambition of discovering what works best to achieve particular societal outcomes 
(Pattyn, 2019). The renaissance of RCTs is clearly associated with the resurgence of nudging or 
behavioral insights practices for policy making, and behavioral public administration in general. 
Broadly speaking, behavioral insights are defined as an ‘inductive approach to policy making that 
combines insights from psychology, cognitive science, and social science with empirically-tested 
results to discover how humans actually make choices’ (OECD, 2017). Experimentation and 
piloting provide a cost-effective way to test different policy scenarios on a small scale. As nudges 
significantly alter the behaviour of firms and citizens without affecting the freedom of choice 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2009), the literature on public policy and administration has started exploring 
the insight of behavioral science in order to generate theoretical predictions at the level of 
individual attitudes and behaviour that are often implicit and seldom empirically tested (James, 
Jilke and Van Ryzin 2017; Grimmelikhuijsen et al 2017). Still a prevailing issue is how to achieve 
not only policy efficacy and efficiency but also legitimacy of nudging. In this context, a conceptual 
framework has been put forward for assessing the extent of effectiveness, efficiency, as well as 
stakeholder support (Tummers 2019). 
While not entirely novel, behavioural insights especially gained popularity and momentum as an 
evaluation practice in mid-2000 on both sides of the Atlantic pond. Both the Obama 
administration in the US and the Cameron coalition government in the UK were fascinated by the 
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possibility to have a ‘soft touch’ to regulation in order to solve market failures and reduce negative 
externalities. Thaler and Sunstein’s (2009) global best-seller book played a major role in this 
respect. By dint of theoretical explanations and practical examples, the authors were able to 
transmit their insights and shook the economic theoretical foundations based on fully economic 
rationality of market operators and individuals. Nowadays, behavioral insights are no longer a mere 
fad, but are increasingly entrenched in policy making of many countries (OECD, 2017). The 
application of behavioral science to public policy is common across the globe. In 2018, there were 
at least 202 public entities relying on nudges (Afif et al. 2018), a number which probably increased 
in the meantime. In Europe, in a time span of eight years ten EU countries established a nudge 
unit: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
–the pioneer- United Kingdom (John, 2019).  
A quantitative analysis has shown that nudge units has been an Anglo-American phenonemon and 
tends to be associated with right-wing governments (John 2019), as behavioral insights are often 
seen as manipulative techniques (Tummers 2019) and an expression of neo-liberalism justifying 
state retreatment and private solutions to social problems (John 2018). Therefore, tense debate 
exists about the nature of nudges, with critics claiming that behavioral sciences give primacy to 
individual-level analysis, and do not sufficiently take the wider social and political relationships 
into account. Irrespective this discussion, cross-country research by Sunstein, Reisch and Kaiser 
(2019) about European citizens’ attitudes on nudges revealed relatively wide approval. Citizen 
evaluations turned out to be relatively similar in most countries, except for Denmark and Hungary. 
General distrust or fear of government seems to matter in this regard.  
International organisations are again a key promoter of nudges across the Europe, but not (yet) to 
the extent of RIA and SCM. The OECD promotes nudges through networking activities and a 
recently launched toolkit for guiding practitioners and policy makers in developing behaviorally 
informed interventions. The EU Joint Research Centre organizes similar networking initiatives, 
and monitors the application of behavioural insights in European countries. However, the main 
driver of nudging diffusion might have been the UK Behavioural Insights Team (BIT). As John 
(2018, p. 81) puts it, ‘BIT has played a role in the international diffusion of behavioural insights as 
used by government and agencies across the world, through its extensive network of international 
contacts and where other governments have seen BIT as a model to emulate’. Since BIT moved 
out of the government in 2014 and was rebranded as the ‘Behavioural Insights Limited’, it has 
been able to expand its personnel and opened offices in New York, Singapore, Sydney, Toronto 
and Wellington. Through thousands of workshops and training courses, it has demonstrated 
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behavioral insights to 20,000 civil servants from all over the world. BIT has also led several 
international projects on behavioural insights applied for instance on corruption (John 2018, p. 
81).  
A more fine-grained picture emerges when also considering the actual institutionalisation of nudge 
units. Different models can be empirically observed (see OECD, 2017; Afif et al., 2018 for an 
extensive description). Some countries have adopted a steering model with a specialised unit within 
the centre of government. These units are charged with the task to apply, support or advocate the 
use of behavioral insights across government. In Germany, for instance, behavioral insights is part 
of strategic foresight within the Chancellary. The unit works with German government 
departments to design and implement interventions. Other countries instead opted for a more 
decentralized specialized model with existing units in departments and agencies focusing on 
behavioral insights. The UK is probably the most well-known example in this respect, with the 
dual presence of BIT and departments coordinating their own unit; a clear sign of institutional 
maturity. A third model is a networked model, as it can be found in the Netherlands and Denmark. 
In the Dutch case, for instance, each ministry is meant to have its own behavioral insights team, 
but the Ministry of Economic Affairs has the role of common secretariat. Governments can also 
merely use behavioral insights for specific projects and initiatives. Finally, but often in addition to 
the other models, governments may work in partnerships with external institutions. The UK BIT 
is again a case in point, albeit it is still co-owned by the government. One can see a reflection of a 
country’s political culture and process, in the type of model they opt for, and how they go about 
institutionalizing it. Yet, countries may change models as time evolves. Interestingly, most 
countries tend to evolve to a decentralized model, as was also the case for the UK and the US 
(Afif et al., 2018).  
Despite the spread of behavioral insights in public policy, the actual applications remain limited in 
terms of depth. According to the World Bank review (Afif et al., 2018), most efforts remain limited 
to an exploratory or pilot phase, or to a particular stage of the policy cycle. Some countries still 
display risk-averse behavior, as the effects of nudging are not yet widely documented. Also, the 
application of RCTs which nudges require still constitutes a main challenge for public 
administrations. Nonetheless, early adopters are clearly maturing and embedding behavioral 
science via standardized procedures and tools, such as in the UK, or in the Netherlands. As time 





While countries have a wide array of evaluation practices and techniques at their disposal, the 
question is wether we can observe any convergence in terms of the evaluation styles. In this 
chapter, we focused on three types of practices that are exemplary for regulatory governance and 
represent different waves of evaluation diffusion. Table 15.3 summarizes our main findings 
highlighting several dimensions related to the sedimentantion of each evaluation practice 
associated with different diffusion waves. Although our analysis is by no means representative for 





SCM RIA RCT/Nudge 
Conceptual clarity YES, based on an 
accounting formula 
NO YES, based on concepts 
and definitions 
developed in behavioral 
science 
Complete diffusion YES, but also fading 
away 
YES, but huge variation 
in the evaluation 
methods adopted 
NO, only few EU 
countries have adopted 
nudges 
Rapid and coherent 
implementation 
YES NO NO 
Extensive 
institutionalization 
NO. Mainly because 
SCM does not require 
major administrative 
capacity 
Partially. In several 
countries RIA is still 
symbolic  
NO. With a few 
exceptions, nudge units 
are still in the pilot 
phase 
Relevant change of 
evaluation style 
NO YES, but only in 
countries that 
succeeded in the 
institutionalization 
YES, but full impact 
will become clear in 
future 





Public support YES Unclear YES, although still 
contested in certain 
countries 
Table 15.3: The extent of sedimentation of regulatory evaluation practices  
 
Altogether, our analysis confirms the relevance of the wave analogy: Countries’ evaluation styles 
are indeed formed by different sediments of evaluation diffusion waves. In determining the extent 
and size of these sediments, several factors turn out to be important, albeit not necessary per se. 
First, as the case of SCM shows, conceptual clarity clearly fosters a rapid and uniform adoption 
across countries. In the case of RIA instead, the lack of conceptual clarity has resulted in a diversity 
of evaluation methods associated with the approach. Secondly, our analysis confirms the key role 
of international organisations and networks in disseminating evaluation practices, at least for SCM 
and RIA. For RCT/Nudge practices, especially pioneering nudge units (i.e., the UK’s BIT unit) 
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took up the role of change agent. Third, public support is a driving factor: as long as governments 
and citizens of many countries have concerns about its legitimacy, the application of nudging in 
the public policy process risks to remain at the pilot phase (Afif et al., 2018). Whereas the 
institutionalisation of evaluation processes takes time (see also Pattyn, 2014), and scholars revealed 
a negative correlation between years of adoption and institutionalisation, evaluation fashions and 
sediments also seem to gradually fade away. With NPM having lost momentum, also the popularity 
of SCM is decreasing. Time will tell which sediments the ‘newer’ evaluation waves will leave in the 
longer run. 
 
What do these results tell us with respect of the increased global similarity of policy evaluation 
styles? What is the actual impact of the adoption of these innovations of regulatory governance 
and policy evaluation procedures? Our results do not confirm the homogenization expectation of 
the convergenist camp based on processes of Americanization (Legrand, 2012) or an 
OECDization of evaluation styles (Magone, 2012; Theodore and Peck, 2012). But they do attest 
the argument that practices founded on theories and methods—such as RCT/nudge and 
CBA/RIA—tend to profoundly change the evaluation culture of European public administrations, 
although the diffusion and institutionalization process is slow and patchy. Conversely, although 
characterized by a rapid diffusion, the SCM is not founded on a solid theoretical and 
methodological foundation, which has resulted in limited cultural change and a legitimation issue 
that undermined its persisting institutionalization. Neither do they disprove the camp of scholars 
who argue that evaluation systems are still revolving around administrative legal families (Peters, 
1997; Peters, 2008). Especially for the actual institutionalization of evaluation practices, our results 
show that there is evidence of clustered convergence clustered mainly around the capacity of 
evaluation and auditing institutions. This partial disprove of both comparative camps calls for 
further theoretically and methodologically assessements of the extent of convergence brought by 
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